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Deborah Widiss continues to make important contributions in an area of 
statutory interpretation that has been largely neglected: the consequences of 
congressional overrides.  Professor Widiss previously demonstrated how the 
Supreme Court and lower courts often confine the reach of statutes that 
purposefully override prior court decisions, thereby reviving aspects of 
the overridden judicial interpretations as ―shadow precedents.‖ 1   In 
Undermining Congressional Overrides: The Hydra Problem in Statutory 
Interpretation,
2  Professor Widiss addresses the Supreme Court‘s further 
expansion of judicial power in the aftermath of congressional disapproval.  
Faced with the override of its textual interpretation in one employment 
discrimination statute, the Court inferred from this repudiation that it could 
approach on a clean slate identical but unamended language in a closely 
related statute.
3   Professor Widiss deftly demonstrates that the Court‘s 
decision to ―grow a new head‖—ignoring both Congress‘s purpose when 
enacting the override and the Court‘s own shadow precedent when 
 
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.  I am grateful to Ethan Leib for very 
helpful comments on an earlier draft.  Thanks to Anthony Piccirillo for valuable research assistance 
and to Cynthia Cameron for excellent secretarial support. 
1
 See Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation of Powers: Statutory 
Interpretation of Congressional Overrides, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV 511 (2009). 
2
 Deborah A. Widiss, Undermining Congressional Overrides: The Hydra Problem in Statutory 
Interpretation, 90 TEXAS L. REV. 859 (2012). 
3
 See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc. 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2349, 2351–52 (2009) (Thomas, J.); id. at 
2356 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  For Professor Widiss‘s overview of Gross, see Widiss, supra note 
2, at 888–93. 
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construing the same language—is unjustified in separation-of-powers terms 
and subversive from a rule-of-law perspective.
4
 
Professor Widiss‘s analysis focuses on Supreme Court decisions in the 
employment discrimination area.  As she explains, the hydra and shadow-
precedent problems are especially likely to arise in this field for two reasons: 
numerous statutes addressing parallel antidiscrimination concerns tend to be 
interpreted in pari materia, and overrides occur with some frequency.
5  But 
the Supreme Court‘s willingness to minimize or distort the meaning of 
congressional overrides extends to other areas of law as well.
6
 
My Response adopts a Congress-centered view of overrides.  It starts 
from a core premise that these overrides signify Congress‘s distrust of the  
Court.
7  Once Congress concludes that the traditional ―faithful agent‖ norm 
for construing a statute
8  is inoperative, the breakdown has important 
implications.  When considering the meaning of an override enactment, 
judges should discount the value of court-centered interpretive assets such as 
ordinary language analysis or the canons of construction.  Indeed, judicial 
reliance on these textualist resources is often associated with overrides in the 
first instance.
9  Rather, courts construing new text that reflects Congress‘s 
disapproval of prior judicial interpretation should pay particular attention to 
congressionally generated evidence explaining the nature and contours of 
that disapproval.  This evidence may appear in a textual statement of 
findings and purpose, but it is more likely to be part of a conference report, 
committee report, or other legislative history. 
Professor Widiss‘s proposed solution to the hydra problem calls for 
courts to adopt a canon-like rebuttable presumption, applying Congress‘s 
signaled meaning to shared language ―so long as the [text in question] can 
 
4
 See Widiss, supra note 2, at 890–900, 908–26. 
5
 Id. at 878–79; Widiss supra note 1, at 536–37. 
6
 See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005) (construing override 
text that revised a federal jurisdiction statute); Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12 (2000) 
(construing override text that revised a criminal law statute); Gutierrez De Martinez v. Lamagno, 
515 U.S. 417 (1995) (construing override text that revised a sovereign immunity statute). 
7
 My focus, like that of Professor Widiss, is on overrides of Supreme Court decisions occurring in a 
relatively short time frame, typically five years or less. 
8
 It is well recognized that ―[i]n the domain of statutory interpretation, Congress is the master.‖ W. 
Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 115 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  See Widiss, 
supra note 1, at 518–20. 
9
 See Daniel J. Bussel, Textualism’s Failures: A Study of Overruled Bankruptcy Decisions 53 
VAND. L. REV. 887, 900–10 (2009) (reporting that a disproportionate number of federal court 
decisions interpreting bankruptcy statutes from 1979 to 1998 that were overridden by Congress 
relied on the textualist method); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory 
Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 347–48 (1991) (reporting that nearly half the overrides 
from 1967 to 1990 address decisions in which the Court‘s primary reasoning was based on plain 
meaning or canons of construction, whereas overrides based on statutory purpose are rare); see 
FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 82 (2009) 
(summarizing findings from various studies). 
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reasonably bear‖ the meaning Congress has identified.10  In the override 
setting, this approach seems unduly deferential to the judicial branch.  
Professor Widiss recognizes that it is hazardous to trust that courts will 
undertake responsible statutory interpretation on an issue where they have 
already acted irresponsibly in Congress‘s eyes.11 
My proposal would tether courts more closely to Congress‘s 
expressions of purpose and intent when construing its amended text.  As 
explained below, legislative history accompanying congressional overrides is 
especially likely to reflect Congress‘s institutional views.  Any risk that the 
formulation of these congressional expressions will be unrepresentative or 
insincere is minimal and can be readily controlled.  Moreover, legislative 
record evidence accompanying override text aptly illustrates why the larger 
debate about legislative history as an interpretive resource should focus on 
which factors lend it greater or lesser probative weight, rather than on 
shopworn arguments about threshold admissibility. 
Part II explains the interbranch implications of overrides, and why 
Congress‘s attitude toward a court it has overridden is appropriately one of 
distrust.  Part III considers the options before Congress for alleviating its 
distrust by clarifying any ambiguity or silence regarding the scope of an 
override.  I agree with Professor Widiss that textual clarification is generally 
not a realistic alternative.  I then discuss why canons or presumptions are no 
more practicable, and why purposive statements and legislative history—
subject to adequate review—should be the preferred option. 
II. Congress‘s Expression of Distrust 
A. The Court’s Failure as Faithful Agent 
The basic constitutional conception of legislative supremacy views 
Congress as vested with supreme policy-making authority under Article I.  
The Court‘s role in legislative matters is to serve as an honest agent, 
construing and enforcing the policy directives embodied in statutes.
12  This 
notion of an honest or faithful agent obviously understates the challenges that 
judges face when interpreting federal laws.  Textualists, intentionalists, and 
purposivists all agree on the importance of deferring to congressional 
authority.  They differ considerably on the proper approach to their 
deferential task and, in particular, on how judges may best respect the 
supremacy of Congress.
13  Still, notwithstanding such differences, there is 
 
10
 Widiss, supra note 2, at 933. 
11
 See id. at 938. 
12
 See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 79 
(2001). 
13
 Compare, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
LAW 14–37 (1997) (arguing that textualism and semantic resources best respect legislative 
supremacy), and John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists, 106 COLUM. L. 
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broad judicial consensus on the need to carry out congressional directives 
subject to possible extrinsic limits imposed by the Constitution. 
When Congress amends the law to codify rejection of a Supreme Court 
decision,
14
 it concludes that the faithful agent norm has been breached.  
Override legislation should be viewed as a distinctive subset of lawmaking in 
general for two reasons.  The first is that legislators focus on the work of the 
judicial branch from a self-consciously institutional perspective.  Most 
problems that capture the attention of the policy community working in and 
around Congress derive from a broad set of economic, social, scientific, 
or moral concerns.  Solutions to these complex problems typically are 
proposed by an array of interested entities and individuals with whom 
Congress regularly interacts.  The politics of lawmaking often requires a 
series of compromise arrangements in order to accommodate these various 
competing interests. 
By contrast, the typical problem giving rise to override legislation is a 
particular Court decision that the current Congress concludes has erroneously 
applied a prior congressional rule, standard, prohibition, or entitlement.  
Legislators are responding in constitutionally aware terms to the exercise of 
power by a coordinate branch.  Their response is to develop and express an 
understanding of how their own institutional authority has been trammeled as 
part of correcting what they view as the transgression.  For this purpose, 
Congress, and especially the standing committees with subject matter 
jurisdiction, tend to devote sustained attention to the judicial decision at 
issue, including a close examination of its reasoning and holding. 
The second distinctive trait of override laws is that Congress conveys its 
considered disapproval of Court action.  This disapproval may on occasion 
be communicated in measured terms, but more often the tone is critical, 
didactic, or angry. 
B. Congress’s View of the Court’s Failure 
As illustrated by the following sample of deliberative statements 
excerpted from congressional findings, committee reports, and floor 
statements, Congress does not mince words when enacting an override 
statute, 
 The conferees agree that the purpose of the amendment to 
section 4(f)(2) is to make absolutely clear . . . that the 
exception does not authorize an employer to require or 
 
REV. 70, 99, 102–03 (2006) (same), with Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in 
Interpreting Statues, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 848–64 (1992) (arguing that intentionalism and 
purposive resources must be part of respect for legislative supremacy), and James J. Brudney, 
Canon Shortfalls and the Virtues of Political Branch Interpretive Assets, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1199, 
1223–24 (2010) (same). 
14
 Like Professor Widiss, I focus on overrides of Supreme Court decisions, although what follows 
is applicable to overrides of lower courts. 
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permit involuntary retirement of an employee within the 
protected age group on account of age.  In McMann v. 
United Airlines, 98 S. Ct. 244 (1977), the Supreme Court 
held to the contrary. . . .  The conferees specifically disagree 
with the Supreme Court‘s holding and reasoning in that case.  
Plan provisions in effect prior to the date of enactment are 
not exempt under section 4(f)(2) by virtue of the fact that 
they antedate the act or these amendments.
15
 
 [I]n Finley v United States, 109 S. Ct. 2003 (1989), the 
Supreme Court cast substantial doubt on the authority of the 
federal courts to hear some claims within supplemental 
jurisdiction. . . .  This section would authorize jurisdiction 
in a case like Finley, as well as essentially restore the pre-
Finley understandings of the authorization for and limits on 
other forms of supplemental jurisdiction.
16
 
 Where, as was alleged in [Lorance v. AT&T Technologies 
Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989)], an employer adopts a rule or 
decision with an unlawful discriminatory motive, each 
application of that rule or decision is a new violation of the 
law. . . .
17   This legislation should be interpreted as 




 [T]he Supreme Court‘s decision [in Bailey v. United States, 
516 U.S. 137 (1995)] that ―use‖ requires ―active 
employment‖ has had a significant impact upon federal drug 
and violent crime prosecutions and convictions across the 
country. . . .  H.R. 424 . . . replaces [the words ―uses‖ or 
―carries‖] with a graded penalty structure for possessing, 
brandishing or discharging a firearm. The word ―possession‖ 
has a broader meaning than either ―uses‖ or ―carries,‖ thus 
reversing the restrictive effect of the Bailey decision.
19
 
 Once again, the Committee intends to overturn the erroneous 
interpretation of the Supreme Court [as to the meaning of 
―subterfuge to evade the purposes of‖ The Age 
 
15
 H.R. REP. NO. 95-950 at 8 (1978) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 528, 529 
(accompanying the Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
256). 
16
 H.R. REP. NO. 101-734 at 28 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860, 6874 (accompanying 
the Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650). 
17
 S. REP. NO. 101-315, pt. 6, at 54 (1990) (accompanying Civil Rights Act of 1990). 
18
 137 CONG. REC. 29,047 (1991) (Sponsors‘ Interpretive Memorandum) (accompanying The Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006)). 
19
 H.R. REP. NO. 105-344, at 5–6 (1997) (accompanying Pub. L. No. 105-386 (1997), To Provide 
for Increased Mandatory Minimum Sentences for Criminals Possessing Firearms, and for Other 
Purposes). 
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Discrimination in Employment Act]. . . .  The Committee 
regrets that the Supreme Court in [Public Employees 
Retirement System of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989)] 
chose not to credit the language of the 1978 Conference 
Report [accompanying an earlier override], language that 
appeared in the Congressional Record and was 
overwhelmingly approved by both Houses of Congress.  
The Committee hopes that in the future, the Supreme Court 
will take more seriously such expressions of legislative 
intent. . . .
20
 
 The Supreme Court in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber 
Co., [550 U.S. 618 (2007)], significantly impairs statutory 
protections against discrimination in compensation that 
Congress established and that have been bedrock principles 
of American law for decades.  The Ledbetter decision 
undermines those statutory protections by unduly restricting 
the time period in which victims of discrimination can 
challenge and recover for discriminatory compensation 




 This series of excerpts indicates how Congress—directly and through its 
designated deliberative agents—elaborates in reasoned terms its 
disappointment with Court decisions.  In many instances, the override 
Congress asserts that the enacting Congress would have disapproved as 
well.
22  Assertions about the intent of an earlier Congress cannot be proven, 
and they have occasionally given rise to debate as to whether statutory law is 
being restored or created.
23  Such debate, however, ought not to obscure a 
basic truth concerning interbranch dialogue in this setting. 
 Congress determining that the Court erred on a matter of statutory 
interpretation is analogous to the Court holding that Congress acted in 
violation of the Constitution.  This analogy holds regardless of whether the 
sanctioning branch purports to act in a restorative or creative manner.  In the 
override setting, the Justices presumably believe they have been faithful to 
the enacting Congress, and they may even conclude the Court is a victim of 
 
20
 S. Rep. No. 101-263, at 29 (1990) (accompanying Pub. L. No. 101-433, Older Workers Benefit 
Protection Act of 1990). 
21
 Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 2 (2009). 
22
 See H.R. REP. NO. 110-237, at 15 (2007) (asserting that the 1991 Congress would have rejected 
the Court‘s decision in Ledbetter); H.R. REP. NO. 103-652, at 169 (1994) (Conf. Rep.) (asserting 
that override of the Court‘s decision in Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994), restores 
original congressional intent). 
23
 See, e.g., Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 304–07 (1994) (discussing the possible 
retroactive effect of the 1991 Civil Rights Act override purporting to restore prior law); West Va. 
Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 101 (1991) (criticizing judicial efforts to reconcile or 
eliminate inconsistencies on a particular subject between earlier and later congresses). 
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bait-and-switch because the override Congress has a new and different intent.  
The same dynamic occurs when the Court invalidates an act of Congress. 
The Justices assert—expressly or implicitly—that invalidation vindicates the 
supremacy of the Constitution as a steady and seamless source of meaning, 
while Congress may believe—at times with justification—that it has been 
victimized by the bait-and-switch of a new constitutional direction.
24
 
When one branch negates the considered judgment of another, its 
message reflects confidence in an area of superior authority.
25   That 
message, typically delivered in a somber or stern tone, also serves as a 
reminder to the rebuked branch that a degree of humility is appropriate.  Not 
surprisingly, the rebuked branch may initially bridle at such a reminder.  
When the Court invalidates a statute, members of Congress often react with 
expressions of anger or hostility.
26  Ultimately, if Congress decides to revisit 
the policy area at issue, it does so based on careful attention to the Court‘s 
earlier reasoning.  This attention is likely to reflect both pragmatic interest in 
avoiding a second invalidation and a certain respect (albeit at times grudging) 
for the Court‘s authority in construing and applying the Constitution. 
When Congress overrides a Supreme Court decision, the reaction of the 
Court is not immediately apparent.  The Justices rarely express substantive 
views outside their opinions, and it typically takes many years before the 
override statute gives rise to a controversy that reaches the Court.  Certain 
justices have suggested that overrides are part of respectful discourse 
between the Court and Congress,
27 and at times, the Court‘s concern to avoid 
constitutional issues leads it to invite congressional clarification even if this 
 
24
 See Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80, 98–115 (2001) 
(demonstrating how the Court after 1995 dramatically altered its approach to reviewing 
constitutionality of federal statutes under both the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
25
 Cf. Emily Hammond Meazell, Deference and Dialogue in Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1722 (2011) (discussing serial litigation as a form of ongoing dialogue between agencies and 
courts).  Agency–court dialogue differs from the Congress–Court override setting in important 
respects.  The agency is not ―master of a domain‖ in the same way as Congress is under Article I, 
as evidenced, inter alia, by modern ―hard-look‖ review under the Administrative Procedure Act.  
See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass‘n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 
(1983); Greater Bos. Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970).  Further, 
dialogue between a court and an agency is typically more tightly confined, focusing on evidence or 
reasoning for a single agency rule, not analogous circumstances. 
26
 See, e.g., 156 CONG. REC. H3443 (daily ed. May 13, 2010) (statement of Rep. Heinrich calling 
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) a ―slap in the face‖); 156 CONG. REC. S274–76 (daily 
ed. Jan. 28, 2010) (statement of Sen. Leahy, sharply critical of the Court‘s decision in Citizens 
United); 136 CONG. REC. S8643 (daily ed. June 25, 1990) (statement of Sen. Helms decrying 
Court‘s decision in United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990)); 136 CONG. REC. H4014–15 
(daily ed. June 21, 1990) (statement of Rep. Clement stating that great patriots would decry the 
Court‘s decision in Eichman). 
27
 See James J. Brudney, The Supreme Court as Interstitial Actor: Justice Ginsburg’s Eclectic 
Approach to Statutory Interpretation, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 889, 911 (discussing Justice Ginsburg‘s 
emphasis on the importance of dialogue rather than diatribe in relations with Congress); id. at 915 
(discussing specific Ginsburg opinions inviting congressional response). 
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results in an override.
28  At other times, though, the Court‘s approach seems 
to verge on arrogance: override follows judicial insistence that the text is so 




 Even if—perhaps especially if—the Court was initially overbearing or 
prideful about its interpretive approach, a proper respect for Congress‘s 
superior authority should lead the Justices to pay close attention to 
Congress‘s override reasoning when construing the subsequent statute.  An 
override signifies that the Court has mischaracterized Congress‘s enacted 
meaning as conceived by the override legislators.  That context frames the 
Court‘s second-stage interpretative task, which is to understand and absorb 
the full extent of its error.  Legislative history can be highly salient in this 




Admittedly, when a controversy involving the meaning of any statute 
reaches the Court, there are likely to be plausible arguments on each side. 
Assuming some gap or ambiguity in the override text, the Court must choose 
to rely on inferences from legislative silence or inaction, on the canons of 
construction, or on legislative history.  From Congress‘s standpoint, the 
override context makes the first two interpretive assets suspect and the third 
one more reliable. 
III. Congress‘s Options to Clarify 
As scholars in law and political science have observed, Congress has 
become more inclined to override Court decisions since the early 1970s.
31  
Factors contributing to heightened legislative scrutiny of federal court 
decisions include the expansion of professional committee staffs, Congress‘s 
 
28
 See generally Lori Hausegger & Lawrence Baum, Inviting Congressional Action: A Study of 
Supreme Court Motivations in Statutory Interpretation, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 162 (1999). 
29
 See, e.g., Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147–48 (1994); West Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. 
Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 100–01 (1991); Pub. Emp. Ret. Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 168 
(1989). 
30
 See Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 425–26 (1995).  See generally Cheryl 
Boudreau et. al., What Statutes Mean: Interpretive Lessons from Positive Theories of 
Communication and Legislation, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 957 (2007). 
31
 E.g. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2, 122 Stat. 3553, 3553–54 
(overriding two Supreme Court decisions construing the ADA); Act of Nov. 13, 1998, Pub. L. No. 
105-386, § 1, 112 Stat. 3469, 3469–70 (overriding the Bailey decision); see also Eskridge, Jr., supra 
note 9, at 338 (reporting data indicating that Congress overrode 5.7 Supreme Court decisions on 
average for each Congress from 1967-1974, but 12.6 decisions per Congress from 1975-1990); Lori 
Hausegger & Lawrence Baum, Behind the Scenes: The Supreme Court and Congress in Statutory 
Interpretation, in GREAT THEATRE: THE AMERICAN CONGRESS IN THE 1990S 224, 228 (1998) 
(discussing overrides through 1996); Nancy C. Staudt et al., Judicial Decisions as Legislation: 
Congressional Oversight of Supreme Court Tax Cases 1954–2005, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1340, 1352–
54 (2007) (reporting that 20% of Court‘s 279 tax decisions in this period triggered an override 
proposal, and 8% (22 proposals) were enacted).   
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growing mistrust of the judicial branch, and the emerging recognition of 
statutes as fundamental norms of governance.
32
  Professor Widiss has 
identified two key interpretive questions faced by courts in the aftermath of 
these overrides. 
First, does Congress‘s correction of a judicial approach when it revises a 
statutory provision with respect to one form of conduct carry over to other 
related forms of conduct covered under the same statutory provision?  For 
instance, when Congress decides that pre-Act employee benefit plans 
permitting involuntary retirement unlawfully evade the purposes of the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act, should the revised law extend to other 
components of pre-Act benefit plans as unlawfully evasive?
33
  When 
Congress decides that the criminal code prohibition against obtaining 
property by means of fraudulent pretenses applies to the intangible property 
right to honest services, should the amended law apply to other 
nontraditional forms of property such as government licenses?
34  Second, 
does Congress‘s correction of a judicial approach when it revises a provision 




Both of these interpretive questions implicate the meaning of legislative 
silence or inaction.  When Congress is focused on correcting what it 
perceives as judicial error, why does it not do so in text for related conduct 
under the same textual provision or for the same conduct in related statutes?  
And if it fails to include text for these related areas, why should courts 
extrapolate from Congress‘s override reasoning, rather than relying on 
language or structure canons such as expressio unius and ―meaningful 
variation‖ to limit Congress‘s override to its precise terms? 
A. Limitations of Legislative Silence 
In understanding why override text may well not capture the full scope 
of Congress‘s disapproval, it is necessary to consider the time frame and 
context in which an override Congress operates.  When rejecting a Court 
decision, Congress is likely to focus initially on what the Court actually held.  
Congress‘s obliteration of the judicial result may simply reflect its 
conclusion that it has done all that was necessary in text under the 
 
32 
See JEB BARNES, OVERRULED? LEGISLATIVE OVERRIDES, PLURALISM, AND CONTEMPORARY 
COURT–CONGRESS RELATIONS 43 (2004); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A 
REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 5–8 (2010). 
33
 See S. REP. NO. 101-263 at 4, 10 (1990) (discussing the meaning of the 1978 ADEA override 
provision as extending beyond involuntary retirement to other pre-Act benefit plan provisions). 
34
 See Public Corruption Prosecution Improvements Act, S. 401, 112th Cong. (2011) (cosponsored 
by Senators Leahy (D.) and Cornyn (R.), among others) (seeking to override Cleveland v. United 
States, 531 U.S. 12 (2000), by amending the related mail fraud statute). 
35
 This question leads to the problem presented in Gross, although as Professor Widiss notes, it is a 
variation on the challenge of discerning the scope and contours of congressional disapproval.  
Widiss, supra note 2, at 875–79. 
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circumstances.  By adopting a prudent approach with respect to its allocation 
of lawmaking resources, Congress maximizes its ability to address other 
important legislative business given the well-recognized institutional 
constraints on its time and political capital.
36
 
In addition, there are important reasons why an override Congress will 
be unable or unwilling to anticipate a series of collateral consequences in 
textual terms.  One is an inescapable lack of awareness as to future policy 
developments covered by the text.  Legislators overriding a Court decision 
are unlikely to be able to foresee decades in advance which new forms of 
property may be fraudulently obtained, or how new components of 
employee-benefit plans may be discriminatorily administered.
37
  No 
inference should be drawn from Congress‘s de facto decision to eschew any 
such efforts at clairvoyance. 
Indeed, Congress‘s committee-based lawmaking structure may at times 
result in an override Congress failing to recognize subtle differences in 
contemporaneous textual formulation of shared policy objectives.  To take a 
notable example, standing committees in the mid-1970s drafted a number of 
new environmental and energy statutes regulating technical and scientific 
subject matter.  Those laws identified expert witness fees separately from 
attorney fees as part of fee-shifting remedial provisions in the lengthy 
regulatory text.
38
  A different standing committee in the same Congress, 
drafting stand-alone text focused on overriding a Court decision in order to 
shift fees for prevailing plaintiffs in civil rights cases, failed to refer 
explicitly to expert witnesses.
39
  Despite ample legislative-history evidence 
that the drafters sought to cover the full costs of vindicating civil rights in the 
litigation process, Congress was forced to enact a second override text to 





 See James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of Statutes: Idle 
Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1, 21–26, 84–85 (1994). 
37
 See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603, 102 Stat. 4181, 4508 
(overriding McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987), on the right to honest services without 
specifically addressing other intangible property rights); Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 2, 92 Stat. 189, 189 (overriding United Air Lines, Inc. 
v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192 (1977) on involuntary retirement without specifically addressing other 
benefit plan components). 
38
 Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469, §§ 19(d), 20(c)(2), 90 Stat. 2003, 2039–40 
(1976) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2618(d), 2619(c)(2) (2006)); Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, § 7002(e), 90 Stat. 2795, 2826 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e) 
(2006)); Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-477, § 17(e), 90 
Stat. 2073, 2076 (codified at 49 U.S.C. app. § 1686(e) (2006)). 
39
 See West Va. Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 108–11 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing 
that ―[t]he Senate Report on the Civil Rights Attorney‘s Fees Awards Act of 1976 explained that the 
purpose of the proposed amendment to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 was ‗to remedy anomalous gaps in our 
civil rights laws created by the United States Supreme Court‘s recent decision‘‖ in Alyeska Pipeline 
Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc‘y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975)). 
40
 Compare West Va. Univ. Hospitals v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 88–89 (1991) (Scalia, J.) (relying on 
fee-shifting language from other statutes), with id. at 110 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (relying on the 
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Apart from lack of awareness, an override Congress may conclude that 
it is too awkward or difficult to codify in anticipation of future controversies.  
Given the legislative goal of offering useful guidance to judges, agencies, 
and practicing attorneys, the override Congress may opt for flexible language 
in order to lessen the chances for erroneous or absurd applications of an 
overly detailed text.  For example, in the complex area of supplemental 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367,
41
 civil procedure scholars maintained 
that trying to address ―all the foreseeables‖ as part of an override was likely 
to yield a text that is ―too prolix and baroque for everyday use.‖42  Congress 
in 1990 settled for a text that was ―concededly not perfect‖ but that did 
manage ―to change the direction taken by the Supreme Court in Finley [v. 
United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989) and] to provide basic guidance (in 
particular the legislative history‘s general approval of pre-Finley case 
law . . .).‖43 
Finally, an override Congress may sensibly decide that when identifying 
some but not all instances of related conduct or related statutes, it risks 
opening a Pandora‘s Box of unpalatable consequences.  As Professor Widiss 
observes, courts have been willing to draw negative inferences when 
Congress modifies a closely analogous statute in certain respects but not 
others, or modifies several comparably worded statutes while leaving 
additional similar statutes unchanged.
44
  Such inferences in effect ascribe to 
the override Congress a level of omniscience that is highly dubious as a 
general matter.
45  These negative inferences seem especially disrespectful 
when Congress has upbraided a court for excessive devotion to literal 
meaning in the first instance.
46
 
Courts and commentators have long raised concerns about attributing 
any legal significance to legislative silence.
47   Gaps in text may carry 
 
legislative history of the statute at issue).  For floor statements from bill managers in both houses, 
see 122 CONG. REC. 31471 (Sens. Scott and Mathias); 33313–14 (Sen. Tunney); 35122–23 (Rep. 
Drinan).  For the override of Casey, see Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 113(b), 
105 Stat. 1071, 1079. 
41
 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2006) (granting supplemental jurisdiction over other claims within the 
same case or controversy over which the district courts have original jurisdiction). 
42
 Thomas D. Rowe et al., Compounding or Creating Confusion About Supplemental Jurisdiction? 




 See Widiss, supra note 2, at 893–900 (discussing the 1991 CRA and a single minor Amendment 
to the ADEA); id. at 923 n.371 (discussing the 2009 Ledbetter Act that amended four statutes but 
not the FMLA). 
45
 See supra notes 37–40 and associated text (describing examples of override Congresses that 
lacked foresight).  See generally William W. Buzbee, The One-Congress Fiction in Statutory 
Interpretation,149 U. PA. L. REV. 171 (2000) (explaining that it is unrealistic to assume that 
Congress is like a single draftsman that knows about all other enacted statutes when it modifies a 
single law). 
46
 See supra note 9. 
47
 See Prostar v. Massachi, 239 F.3d 669, 678 (5th Cir. 2001) (pointing out that congressional 
silence is not a good interpretive guide because it could be caused by ―unawareness, preoccupation, 
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probative weight in certain limited circumstances,
48
 but for all the reasons 
discussed above, these gaps are weak candidates to be given presumptive 
significance in an override setting. 
B. Shortcomings of the Canons 
Language canons, resting on the problematic assumption that statutes 
can be self-defining,
49
are also an unsatisfactory option in the override 
context.  As background norms, they allow courts to assign controlling 
weight to what judges regard as conventional usage. The privileging of 
courts‘ linguistic puzzle-solving abilities over Congress‘s efforts at 
deliberative communication during the lawmaking process is troubling in this 
setting.  While one may accept arguendo that courts as a general matter do 
not act primarily from ideological motives, judicial policy preferences loom 
larger in areas of override frequency such as civil rights and criminal law.
50  
Courts surely do care about institutional legitimacy, as Professor Widiss 
observes,
51  but the pattern of overrides with respect to civil rights and 
criminal statutes suggests that the Justices‘ ideological orientation may not 
infrequently trump institutional concerns.
52
 
Beyond such general considerations, there are familiar problems with 
the particular language canons touted as clarifying override texts.  The 
expressio unius canon is invoked to provide meaning when an override 
Congress modifies regulation of one item under a statutory provision yet not 
others.  But this canon presumes a level of congressional awareness and 
 
or paralysis‖).  See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. 
L. REV. 67 (1988); Daniel L. Rotenberg, Congressional Silence in the Supreme Court, 47 U. MIAMI 
L. REV. 375 (1992). 
48
 See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 600 (1983) (attributing significance to 
nonaction by Congress); Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara Cnty., Cal., 480 U.S. 616, 629 n.7 
(1987) (same). 
49
 See Philip P. Frickey, Faithful Interpretation, 73 WASH. U. L. Q. 1085, 1089 (1995). 
50
 See Eskridge, Jr., supra note 9, at 344 (reporting that 15% of congressional overrides from 1967–
1990 involved criminal law; civil rights and antitrust were the next highest subject areas at 9% 
each).  For subsequent overrides in the criminal and civil rights areas, see, e.g., note 21 (addressing 
a 2009 override in civil rights) and note 31 (addressing 1994 and 1997 overrides in criminal law and 
2008 override in civil rights). 
51
 See Widiss, supra note 2, at 938. 
52
 With respect to civil rights, it is noteworthy that the early Rehnquist Court was overridden on 
numerous high profile decisions in the 1990 Older Workers Benefit Protection Act and the 1991 
Civil Rights Act, and the Roberts Court in its initial period suffered a similar well publicized fate in 
the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009.  The overridden decisions generally relied on language 
canons and rejected or ignored legislative history.  See Pub. Emp. Ret. Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492 
U.S. 158, 168 (1989); West Va. Univ. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 99 (1991); Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire 
& Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 661 (2007) (Ginsburg, J. dissenting); Casey, at 115 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (―In the domain of statutory interpretation, Congress is the master.  It obviously has the 
power to correct our mistakes, but we do the country a disservice when we needlessly ignore 
persuasive evidence of Congress‘ actual purpose and require it ‗to take the time to revisit the matter‘ 
and to restate its purpose in more precise English whenever its work product suffers from an 
omission or inadvertent error.‖). 
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comprehensive foresight in the drafting process that is questionable when 
Congress is focused on rejecting a particular judicial outcome.
53
  Similarly, 
the ―meaningful variation‖ canon is relied on to justify an inference that 
Congress knowingly limited its error correction to conduct in a single statute.  
As Professor Widiss convincingly explains, this inference of intentionality is 
generally unwarranted.
54
  Finally, there is the ―whole code‖ canon, 
encouraging courts to ascribe consistent meaning to certain terms that appear 
in unrelated titles of the U.S. Code.
55
  Such reliance on remote interstatutory 
references has been singled out for criticism because it is so clearly prone to 
judicial manipulation (and also because it can unsettle bodies of federal law 
not before a court).
56  The Supreme Court‘s reliance in Gross on language 
from statutes addressing organized crime and consumer protection to 




In contrast to the language canons invoked regularly by the Supreme 
Court to shape the meaning of override statutes, Professor Widiss‘s proposed 
canonical presumption is more sensitive to this setting.  Nonetheless, her 
suggestion—for a fresh interpretation that is ―consistent with the meaning 
Congress signaled it ascribes to the relevant language, so long as the 
preexisting language can reasonably bear such meaning‖58—would allow 
courts to trump Congress‘s signals based on judges‘ own version of what is 
reasonable textual analysis.  Implicit in Professor Widiss‘s presumption is a 
belief that Congress can define the scope of its override in sufficiently 
concrete textual terms, and that courts will act faithfully to implement its 
more concrete definitional approach.
59
  In the override context, this level of 
trust is laudable but misplaced.  As we have already seen, Congress has a 
range of sound reasons to be less than fully concrete in its override text, and 
courts in the override setting have established a record of deviating from 
their role as faithful agent.
60
 
C. Potential of Legislative History 
This is not the place to revisit at length arguments about why legislative 
history is pragmatically valuable or constitutionally privileged as an 
 
53
 See supra text accompanying notes 36–46; RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS 
AND REFORM 277–82 (1985). 
54
 See Widiss, supra note 2, at 874. 
55
 See Buzbee, supra note 45, at 221; Widiss, supra note 2, at 874. 
56
 Buzbee, supra note 45, at 234–40. 
57
 See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (2009); Widiss, supra note 2, at 875. 
58
 Widiss, supra note 2, at 933 (emphasis added). 
59
 Id. at 933–38. 
60
 See supra text accompanying notes 15–21 (reproducing six examples of congressional criticism 
of Supreme Court reasoning as part of the override process); supra note 31 and accompanying text 
(discussing the substantial increase in overrides since 1974). 





  Judges and scholars advocating for its use recognize 
that the reliability of legislative record evidence in any given case depends 
on its level of presumptive trustworthiness for members who were seeking to 
understand the text on which they voted.  Because the primary audience for 
explanations of bill support found in committee reports and key floor 
statements is other legislators and their staffs, the question responsible judges 
effectively ask is how likely these explanations are to have been noticed, 
understood, and accepted by the prototypical ―reasonable member of 
Congress‖ who voted for enactment.62 
Professor Widiss has warned that in our textualist era, many judges 
construing override language refuse to consult legislative history at all.
63
  I 
will bracket for now the possibility that such a categorical refusal to consider 
Congress‘s designated work product amounts to gravely irresponsible 
judicial behavior.
64
  Even for legislative history skeptics, however, 
expressions of disapproval accompanying a congressional override are 
worthy of serious attention. 
For a start, consider that traditional pragmatic concerns—stemming 
from the perceived risk of manipulative insertion or readily overlooked 
commentary—will have little or no foundation.  An override provision is a 
direct, institutionally conscious response to a judicial decision.  In rejecting 
the court‘s position, Congress critically engages both the court‘s holding and 
its reasoning.  As the excerpts in subpart II(B) make clear, override 
legislative history is focused on explaining and elaborating congressional 
disapproval.  It seems perverse for any court to ignore entirely such detailed 
discussion of what an override provision is meant to accomplish. 
The presumptive relevance of override legislative history does not mean 
that all such history is equally probative.  Several questions should be 
considered when assigning appropriate weight to committee report or floor 
commentary amplifying the basis of Congress‘s disapproval.  One factor is 
whether the override text itself was controversial or divisive among 
members.  If legislators are deeply divided on the scope of what is being 
overridden, legislative history explaining the override is not likely to reflect 
institutional consensus.
65
  Conversely, if legislators are unanimous or close 
 
61
 See generally Boudreau et. al., supra note 30; Breyer, supra note 13; Brudney, supra note 13. 
62
 This is the same prototypical reasonable member who, ―by a benign fiction,‖ is assumed to 
understand both ordinary linguistic meaning and the surrounding body of law into which a text must 
be integrated.  Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., 
concurring); see Brudney, supra note 36, at 76–78. 
63
 See Widiss, supra note 1, at 563. 
64
 See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Warp and Woof of Statutory Interpretation: 
Comparing Supreme Court Approaches in Tax Law and Workplace Law, 58 DUKE L.J. 1231, 1292–
94 & n.249 (2009) (reporting positions taken by numerous senators from both parties that courts 
should pay attention to legislative history as a general matter). 
65
 A classic example is legislative history accompanying the 1991 Civil Rights Act override of 
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).  See 137 CONG. REC. 28855–56 (1991) 
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to unanimous, then explanations summarizing the purpose or meaning of 
override text deserve to be taken more seriously.
66
 
A second factor is whether the override commentary is expressed in 
readily comprehensible terms.  The more clearly a committee report or floor 
explanation elaborates on the intended scope or contours of an override, the 
more weight courts should attach.  One example is the 1978 conference 
report that accompanied override of McMann stating that ―[t]he conferees 
specifically disagree with the Supreme Court‘s holding and reasoning,‖ and 
then explaining that no benefit plan provisions are exempt from the Act 
―[simply] by virtue of the fact they antedate the act or these amendments.‖67  
Another example, emphasized by Professor Widiss, is the House committee 
report accompanying the 1991 Civil Rights Act.  Judiciary committee 
members made clear their intention that the amendment to Title VII 
overriding Price Waterhouse should be used by courts as a basis for 
construing mixed-motive provisions in numerous other workplace 
antidiscrimination laws that had regularly been interpreted as consistent with 
Title VII.
68
  Although these two illustrations involve override commentary 
setting forth a broad scope, Congress also may express a clear intent that 
override text be narrowly applied.  In overriding the Court‘s Finley decision 
in 1990, Congress stated in both committee reports that the text was meant to 
reject only that decision while otherwise codifying and preserving pre-Finley 




(statement of Sen. Danforth) (noting the conflicting interpretive memoranda inserted in the 
Congressional Record on the precise meaning of the Wards Cove override provisions, and adding ―a 
court would be well advised to take with a large grain of salt floor debate and statements placed into 
the Congressional Record which purport to create an interpretation for the legislation that is before 
us‖). 
66
 For example, the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650 (overriding the Finley 
decision) passed the House by a vote of 87–18 and passed the Senate by voice vote.  See Bill 
Summary and Status 95
th
 Congress (1977-78) HR 5383 THOMAS (LIBRARY OF CONGRESS), 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d101:HR05316:@@@X.  The Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, 92 Stat. 189 (overriding the decision in 
United Airlines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192 (1977)), passed the House by a vote of 359–4 and 
passed the Senate by a vote of 88–7.  See Bill Summary and Status, 95th Congress (1977 - 1978), 
HR5383, THOMAS (LIBRARY OF CONGRESS).  While the risk of strategically planted explanations 
exists even for near-unanimously approved laws, it is de minimis with respect to such targeted, self-
conscious discussions. 
67
 The Conference Committee report is quoted in full.  See supra text accompanying note 15  The 
Court subsequently declined to rely on this override history, which led to a second override on the 
same point of law.  See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
68
 See Widiss, supra note 2, at 885–86 (quoting a House Judiciary Committee Report stating that 
the Committee intends for related statutes to be interpreted consistently with Title VII as amended).  
The Court in Gross ignored this legislative history. 
69
 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.  The Court rejected relying on this legislative history, 
and instead construed the 1990 override text as altering pre-existing law in additional respects.  
Compare Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 567–71 (2005) (Kennedy, J.), 
with id. at 572–77 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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A third factor affecting probative weight is whether the override 
commentary is consistent with the larger purpose or thrust of the statute.  In 
the 1991 Civil Rights Act, Congress overrode or modified as many as eleven 
Supreme Court decisions in a single law.
70  Congress also made clear in text 
that one of its main purposes was to respond to these recent Court decisions 
―by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide 
adequate protection to victims of discrimination.‖ 71   This expansive 
remedial framework should not be enough on its own to overcome 
unequivocal evidence of a narrower legislative intent regarding a particular 
court decision, as set forth in text or case-specific override commentary.  At 
the same time, when Congress expresses a broad-based determination to 
undo constraints imposed by the Court in an entire area of law, that larger 
purpose should tilt the interpretive scales, especially when it is consistent 
with clearly expressed override commentary on the disapproved decision.
72
 
Finally, there are certain overarching limits on the weight attributable to 
override commentary.  One is an override text that expresses in positive 
terms—not through negative inferences from gaps or ambiguities—the 
precise contours or limits of Congress‘s disapproval. 73   Another is the 
applicability of the substantive canon of constitutional avoidance.  If 
construing an override text and accompanying commentary one way would 
raise serious doubts as to its constitutionality, and an alternative construction 
is not plainly contrary to Congress‘s intent, the Court may choose the 
alternative even if the ―avoided‖ construction has some support in the 
 
70
 See Ruth Colker, The Mythic 43 Million Americans With Disabilities, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1, 17 & n.60 (2007) (listing nine decisions overridden by the Civil Rights Act of 1991).  Two more 
decisions were overridden in the 1991 Act.  See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 
§§ 109, 113(b), 105 Stat. 1071, 1077–79 (amending Title VII so that it applies extraterritorially, 
thereby overriding the Court‘s holding in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991), 
and amending the statute that the Court held excluded expert fees in West Va. Univ. Hosps. v. 
Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991), so that it explicitly includes expert fees). 
71
 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3(4), 105 Stat. 1071, 1071. 
72
 See Widiss, supra note 2, at 899–900.  Conversely, if the override provision is a small and 
discrete part of a larger statute with a separate thrust, then such purposive considerations should 
carry less weight.  See, e.g., Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603, 102 Stat. 
4181, 4508 (overriding McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987), by defining ―a scheme or 
artifice to defraud‖ to include ―a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of 
honest services‖). 
73
 See Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, §§ 2, 7, 102 Stat. 28, 28, 31 
(―The Congress finds that (1) certain aspects of recent decisions and opinions of the Supreme Court 
have unduly narrowed or cast doubt upon the broad application of title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Age Discrimination Act of 
1975, and title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; and (2) legislative action is necessary to restore 
the prior consistent and long-standing executive branch interpretation and broad institution-wide 
application of those laws as previously administered. . . .  Nothing in the amendments made by this 
Act shall be construed to extend the application of the Acts so amended to ultimate beneficiaries of 
Federal financial assistance excluded from coverage before enactment of this Act.‖). 





  The avoidance canon has drawn criticism from judges 
and scholars and it is surely susceptible to abuse.
75
  Still, for present 
purposes it is enough to observe that a court faithfully seeking to avoid 
invalidation of an override text may at times impose limits on the scope of 
Congress‘s expressed intentions.76 
IV. Conclusion 
In two well-crafted articles, Professor Widiss has unmasked the Court‘s 
recent pronounced tendency to disrespect Congress in the override setting.  
Her critique of the Gross decision is devastatingly effective, and in her 
proposed solution, she is inclined to privilege congressional signals over 
judicial ones when construing the scope and meaning of override text.
77
  My 
Response has built on her inclination, arguing that override legislative history 
is entitled to special weight when contrasted with textual silence and 
language canons.  The fact that some justices are unwilling to consider this 
(or any other) legislative history is disturbing but hardly dispositive.  From 
the perspective of legislative supremacy and judicial responsibility, it is time 
to renounce such zeal in the override context. 
 
74
 See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 
568, 575–78 (1988). 
75
 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 53, at 285; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-
Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 
640–45 (1992) (criticizing the Court for selectively using the clear statement rule to protect some 
constitutional values but not others); Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 
71, 74 (1995) (lamenting the fact that interpreting a statute to avoid constitutional questions 
frequently results in an interpretation that the drafters would not have preferred). 
76
 See Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2927–31 (2010) (construing an override 
amendment of a wire-fraud statute to avoid unconstitutional vagueness by limiting the amendment 
to cover only bribes and kickbacks rather than the wider honest-services category that Congress 
intended). 
77
 See Widiss, supra note 2, at 933. 
